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Abstract. An NGO, the Centre International de Développement et de Recherche (CIDR, International Centre 
for Development and Research), supported a network of mutual health organisations in the Mbozi district of 
the Mbeya region in Tanzania. The target population were households living in rural areas from the informal 
sector that had access to the services of a private religious hospital. The project was not in line with the na-
tional policy that, for this population category, promoted Community Health Funds (CHFs), voluntary health 
coverage organisations that only provide access to the district’s public care structures and are therefore man-
aged by district authorities. The results obtained by the network of mutual organisations provided an incen-
tive for a partnership between public and private stakeholders. The partnership gave rise to the development 
of hybrid mutual and CHF organisations and allowed mutual organisations and the private hospital to beneit 
from subsidies reserved for CHFs. The partnership was replicated in the neighbouring district of Kyela, with 
the subsidising of contributions by the district and a private company (Biolands) that sells cocoa. The cover-
age by mutual organisations of people living with HIV/AIDS was organised thanks to the Elton John 
Foundation and associations of patients. The results of this extended partnership were even better than in the 
neighbouring district. The conditions for the success and sustainability of the experiment are discussed here.
Keywords. Public-private partnership, social protection, Tanzania, micro health insurance.
1 Introduction
Partnerships between public and private stakeholders in the 
area of medical care are frequent in developing countries. 
They are rarer in the area of social health protection, where 
public and private organisations most often have their own 
areas of intervention. The experiment that was launched in 
Tanzania, in two districts in the Mbeya region, on the initia-
tive of an NGO, the Centre International de Développement 
et de Recherche (CIDR, International Centre for Development 
and Research), was in this respect a valuable innovation. 
It involved:
• public stakeholders: district health authorities and the 
public care establishments that they manage, 
Community Health Funds (CHFs), which are voluntary 
community health insurance schemes that are nonethe-
less public initiatives and are managed by the district
• private stakeholders: private mutual-type schemes sup-
ported by the NGO, private non-proit care establish-
ments, a private company that sells cocoa, a private 
foundation, and another NGO involved in the control of 
HIV-AIDS.
2 The experiment
2.1 Background and the initial project supported  
by the CIDR
Tanzania began developing health protection schemes in the 
1990s. Enrolment was made mandatory for civil servants and 
then for the State’s contract workers, who are afiliated with 
the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF), which launched 
its services in 2001. This obligation was then broadened to 
the employees of private and semi-public companies, most of 
whom are afiliated with the Social Health Insurance Beneit 
under the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), which was 
launched in 2005. Mandatory insurance provides access to all 
of the country’s approved public, private and charitable es-
tablishments. Approximately 12% of the population was en-
rolled in a mandatory scheme at the end of 2010.
For the informal sector in rural areas, the government be-
gan promoting the CHF model, in which enrolment is volun-
tary, in 1996. CHFs offer modest coverage for a fairly low 
contribution: free access limited to the district’s public care 
establishments. The contributions, which vary between the 
districts, are collected in clinics and transferred to the district 
level where they are managed by the medical team. CHF 
funds are pooled and redistributed to primary structures to Correspondence to: Alain Letourmy 
letourmy@vjf.cnrs.fr
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improve care quality. Representatives of the local popula-
tion, appointed by the district’s administration, sit on 
monitoring committees which oversee the CHFs and care 
structures. Slightly less than 4% of the population was cov-
ered by CHFs at the end of 2010. For the urban informal 
sector, organisations similar to the CHFs, TIKAs, were pro-
moted. In addition to CHFs and TIKAs, there are some mu-
tual organisations and voluntary micro-health insurance 
schemes that are set up by charitable organisations and are 
often associated with private non-proit establishments. This 
category of organisation is linked to the Self Managed Health 
Insurance Schemes (SMHISs) that the CIDR launched in ru-
ral areas, in the Mbozi district of the Mbeya region, in the 
southwest part of the country. 
The project that was launched by the NGO in 2002 ini-
tially took the form of participatory micro-insurance in a set 
of villages; the SMHISs were networked in view of their 
professional management. SMHISs are different from 
CHFs in three key respects. First, they are paying organisa-
tions whose contributions are calculated based on risk and 
they are independent of care providers. Depending on the 
village, contributions range from 3,000 to 5,000 TSh per 
person and per year (€1.5 to 2.5). On the other hand, CHFs 
are closely linked to public establishments, are inanced ir-
respective of their members’ risk and do not pay care pro-
viders. In this respect, it is worth comparing CHFs to mi-
cro-insurance organisations. Enrolment in the district’s 
CHFs costs 10,000 TSh per family (6 members) and per 
year (€5). Second, SMHISs adhere to the mutual system 
principle of governance by members, while CHFs are in 
reality managed by the district’s administration, since the 
monitoring committees have no real power. Lastly, SMHIS 
coverage includes access to a private religious hospital in 
Mbozi, the Moravian Church Mbozi Hospital (MCMH), 
and offers an ambulance service and the transportation of 
dead bodies, whereas CHFs only give access to the dis-
trict’s public establishments, from clinics to the district 
public hospital.
The distribution of CHFs across the country is unequal, 
and their attractiveness is generally low. Pregnancy-
related care and care for children under the age of ive 
years are free in clinics, which adults do not systemati-
cally frequent since they complain about the weak diag-
nostic capacities of the nurses. Furthermore, the low cost 
of enrolment serves little purpose, especially since drug 
shortages are frequent. In the Mbozi district, competition 
between SMHISs and CHFs turned in favour of the for-
mer. Access to the MCMH, which is more popular than 
the district public hospital due to the hospitality and qual-
ity of its staff and is better stocked with drugs, and the 
ambulance service were advantages that did not go unno-
ticed by the population. The population preferred the out-
patient services of the MCMH over those of the clinics. 
The rate of enrolment in mutual organisations was higher 
than the rate of enrolment in local CHFs. In 2005-2006, 
SMHISs accounted for 11% of the total sum of payments 
due to the MCMH. The number of beneiciaries increased 
from 721 in 2003 with 4 mutual organisations to 8,000 in 
2006 with 15 village-based mutual organisations and 2 
school-based mutual organisations. The coverage rate in 
the area of intervention was 13%.
The success of the private project in Mbozi and especially 
the low attractiveness of the CHFs sparked tension between 
the project and the district. It was said that the SMHISs 
robbed the district CHFs of their members and the fact that 
the MCMH, a private hospital, was more attractive than the 
district hospital, which was excluded from SMHIS coverage, 
did not make the project popular among local authorities. 
2.2 The partnership between the network of mutual 
organisations and the district, the policy of 
subsidies to CHFs
However, some SMHIS members wanted to include clinics 
close to their village in the mutual coverage, which moti-
vated the project to establish a partnership with the district 
authorities. The irst act of partnership took the form of a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the District 
Council, the network of mutual organisations and the CIDR 
in 2007. It gave SMHIS members access to clinics for a fee 
of 500 TSh per person and per year, irrespective of use and 
with no copayment. Five thousand mutual organisation ben-
eiciaries chose this option.
At the same time, the mediocre results obtained by the 
CHFs in terms of enrolment led the Tanzanian government 
to analyse the reasons behind their low attractiveness to 
stimulate their development. It determined that the core 
problem was the quality of the care services offered with 
enrolment. Quality improvement was dependent upon the 
resources contributed to public establishments, and from 
this standpoint, the low contribution from the CHFs was a 
handicap. It would have been feasible to directly fund the 
care structures, but the policy was to subsidise demand to 
motivate the structures to stimulate CHF enrolments. 
Subsidisation occurred through a multiplier process: it was 
decided that for each enrolment in a CHF, the district would 
receive twice the paid amount, to provide it with more re-
sources to improve care quality and set in motion a virtu-
ous circle: this improvement would increase demand for 
enrolment and over time, the subsidy could be reduced. 
The government set up a matching fund to boost the CHFs, 
since clinics were encouraged to further promote the CHFs 
at the same time. The fund, which initially was directly i-
nanced by the World Bank, was then inanced with the 
State budget.
2.3 Extension of the partnership
For the SMHISs, the matching fund was a valuable opportu-
nity, provided that they could beneit from it, which was not 
evident in that these organisations were not CHFs. 
The partnership between public and private stakeholders in 
the Mbozi district nonetheless led to a new MoU in 2008 that 
extended the bases of the public/private partnership, by in-
corporating the MCMH in the partnership, by including the 
district public hospital in SMHIS coverage and especially by 
allowing the SMHISs to partially beneit from the matching 
fund. The MoU also provided for the launch of a hybrid 
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organisation in two villages: the Self Managed Community 
Health Fund (SMCHF), which introduced the principles of 
mutual organisations into CHFs as discussed below.
Access to the matching fund for mutual organisations was 
negotiated as follows: a) SMHISs would transfer the total 
amount of contributions to the district level, b) the district 
would add these contributions to those collected by the 
CHFs and ask the fund to double the total amount, c) once 
this amount was obtained, the district would return the 
SMHIS contributions and share the matched amount re-
ceived from the fund: 25% for the SMHISs, 50% for the 
district, 25% for the MCMH. Under this process, the dis-
trict, the network of mutual organisations and the MCMH 
were therefore all winners and received resources to achieve 
their own objectives: improve public care for the district, 
obtain cash for the MCMH, indirectly subsidise contribu-
tions for the network. In 2009, 32 million TSh (€16 million) 
were transferred by the network of mutual organisations. 
In return, in 2010, it received 8 million TSh (€4 million) 
in addition to contributions, and the MCMH also received 
8 million TSh. In 2010, 39.5 million TSh (€20 million) were 
transferred and in 2011, nearly 55 million TSh were trans-
ferred (€27.5 million).
Another positive step was taken in 2011, with a new MoU: 
the institutionalisation of the SMHIS network and the unii-
cation of the SMHIS and CHF models. The SMHIS princi-
ples will gradually be applied to the district CHFs, which will 
be co-managed by the SMHIS network and the Council 
Health Service Board. The new Self Managed Community 
Health Fund (SMCHF) model was set up in 5 villages in 
2011, with 288 members and 1,051 beneiciaries. This time 
the MoU precisely described the organisational principles of 
this hybrid organisation:
1 Combine the comparative advantages of the two 
models (SMHIS/CHF)
2 Enhance the product’s attractiveness
3 Separate supply and demand for care so providers may 
be paid based on the actual cost of care given to 
beneiciaries
4 Set up a member-based CHF association with partici-
patory governance open solely to members
5 Organise the joint management and supervision by 
district authorities of collected funds
6 Introduce a system for the professional management of 
information
7 Improve coverage without increasing contributions
8 Allocate funds (contributions and the matching fund) 
in a way that promptly improves the quality of care
9 Increase the number of qualiied healthcare personnel 
in health centres and clinics
10 Develop an eficient transport system
The extension of the partnership is an upshot of the results 
obtained by the SMHISs (Table 1). 
Table 1. Growth of the number of mutual organisations in the 
Mbozi district 
Fiscal Year Beneiciaries Number of mutual  
organisations
2003-2004 721 4
2004-2005 3,589 7
2005-2006 6,638 15
2006-2007 7,978 17
2007-2008 9,792 20
2008-2009 11,228 24
2009-2010 10,837 28
2010-2011 13,643 30
The extension is also a result of the success achieved in 
the neighbouring Kyela district, where the project directly 
developed a hybrid Community Health Insurance Fund 
(CHIF) model.
3  The project’s extension to Kyela
Three years after the project was launched in the Mbozi dis-
trict, a feasibility study was undertaken by the CIDR in the 
neighbouring district of Kyela, in view of creating a second 
SMHIS network in an area where the population mainly lives 
off of cocoa farming. The plan in Kyela was to launch a few 
SMHISs and enter into an agreement with the private reli-
gious hospital of Matema, similar to the MCMH in Mbozi. 
The study identiied two avenues for work, one with the 
Kyela district, and the other with the company Biolands, the 
world’s largest cocoa exporter, which sells a percentage of 
the cocoa farmed in the area. 
The relations developed with the district were initially 
tense, on account of the future competition between the 
SMHISs and the district CHFs. They then improved, partly 
thanks to the proposed CHIFs, which combine participatory 
and professional management, but unlike the SMCHFs are 
directly linked to CHFs, and also thanks to the agreement 
with the Kyela district public hospital, the Ipinda public 
health centre and a few public clinics. The CHIF model is 
likely to enhance the CHFs and make them more attractive. 
CHIFs are eligible for the matching fund and a MoU was 
signed in 2010 with the Kyela district.
The company Biolands had heard about the Mbozi SMHISs 
and was interested in subsidising the enrolment of farmers 
from the Kyela area in a mutual health organisation. But it did 
not want health coverage to be publicly managed, and was 
therefore satisied with the CHIF model. Biolands agreed to 
pay a lump-sum amount for ive years to cover over half 
(60%) of the district farmers’ contributions, whether or not 
these farmers were its suppliers, and collected contributions 
from its suppliers, thus reducing the work of the CHIFs. To 
A. Letourmy et al: A public/private partnership experiment in the area of social health protection in Tanzania 
4 Field Actions Science Reports
avoid discrimination, the district agreed to subsidise the con-
tributions of non-cocoa-producing members. Table 2 below 
presents the subsidisation process. Enrolment is free for chil-
dren under the age of 5 years
Table 2. Financing of contributions in the Kyela district
Item Cocoa 
producers
Non-cocoa 
producers
Contribution (in TSh 
per person and per 
year) for individuals 
over the age of 5 years
5,000
Subsidy 3,000
from Biolands
3,000
from the district
Beneiciary fee 2,000 (around 1 euro)
Coverage includes outpatient services and hospitalisation 
at the Matema Lutheran hospital (private), the Kyela district 
hospital, the Ipinda health centre (public), public clinics and 
the clinic of a mining company. The subsidisation of contri-
butions facilitated the rapid start-up of the CHIF network, 
which was launched at the end of 2010. In June 2011, there 
were 10,569 beneiciaries with 40 CHIFs.
3.1 Coverage for people affected by HIV/AIDS
The Kyela district also provided an opportunity to address a 
problem that had not been discussed in Mbozi: coverage for 
people living with HIV/AIDS. The prevalence of HIV/
AIDS is high in the two districts: in 2008 it was 15.8% in 
Kyela and 16.7% in Mbozi among blood donors, versus 7% 
at the national level. This reality was a limiting factor for the 
development of CHIFs, since the cost of risk was much 
higher and the enrolment of patients or people living with 
HIV could threaten the balance of mutual organisations. The 
problem was not so much testing, routine follow-up 
examinations and the administration of antiretrovirals 
(ARVs), which were covered by a national programme, as it 
was the inancing of care for HIV patients with opportunis-
tic diseases. These were not, in practice, covered by the na-
tional programme and represented high costs for patients. 
Furthermore, some exhaustive examinations were also ex-
cluded from the national programme and were therefore 
charged to hospital establishments.
An opportunity presented itself to the network when the 
Elton John Foundation, which contacted the CIDR, ex-
pressed a desire to intervene in the region. It proposed to 
develop an insurance fund to cover HIV/AIDS patients that 
were members of mutual organisations when they were 
found to be seropositive or infected with the disease. Thus, 
the inancial risk related to the non-selection of HIV/AIDS 
patients could be controlled by the network of mutual organ-
isations, as the people in question would be identiied by 
care establishments involved in the control of HIV/AIDS 
and the insurance fund, inancially separate from the mutual 
organisations, would cover their costs. This system therefore 
made mutual organisations attractive to people living with 
HIV/AIDS, and also allowed for the protocol to include 
NGOs specialising in the control of the disease such as 
Mango Tree, which was already a partner of the national pro-
gramme. At the same time, Mango Tree paid the contribu-
tions of 1,330 beneiciaries, agents in the control of HIV/
AIDS, and then those of 301 affected people. What was set 
up in the Kyela district should now be replicated in Mbozi, 
particularly with other HIV/AIDS associations, and perhaps 
in other high-prevalence areas.
4 Discussion
4.1 The experiment’s success factors
The partnership was developed thanks to several general and 
local circumstances. 
The national health inancing policy was not designed to 
be comprehensive and the government set priorities that 
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gave rise to multiple health coverage schemes. It focused on 
afirming the principle of healthcare payment, which justi-
ied the promotion of health insurance. It also privileged the 
launch of the NHIF and procedures for agreements with es-
tablishments, overlooking health protection in the informal 
sector. The CHF concept was then adopted to develop vol-
untary health protection, but the pilot experiment was not 
conclusive and the Ministry of Health did not allocate suf-
icient resources for the national deployment of this type of 
organisation. When the coordination of coverage arose as an 
issue for national policy, the NHIF was appointed to pro-
pose solutions tailored to the informal sector, but its ield 
approach did not allow headquarters to take rapid action. 
Locally, the NHIF’s regional management, in charge of 
managing the practical aspects of the matching fund, had an 
opportunity to assess the results achieved by the network of 
mutual organisations supported by the CIDR and encour-
aged the partnership. This was especially true since it was 
familiar with the MCMH, which welcomed the NHIF’s lo-
cal beneiciaries and with which it had signed a speciic 
pricing agreement.
Several other factors released the tension between the net-
work of mutual organisations and the Mbozi district and led 
to negotiations between the MCMH, the SMHIS network and 
the district. On the one hand, some funders from the Tanzanian 
State for health, which also inanced the NGO, were in favour 
of changing the CHF model and considered that the SMHISs 
were a valuable experiment in this respect. They therefore 
wanted to reduce tension between public and private stake-
holders, so as to not have to choose between two antagonistic 
models. On the other hand, from a more general perspective, 
the public/private partnership concept was promoted by 
funders and the government and began being applied in the 
health sector. Thus, the Mbeya regional health directorate did 
not have the same original reservations as the district regard-
ing private stakeholders. Along the same lines, the chief doc-
tor in the Mbeya region put together a committee on the sub-
ject, whose chairmanship was entrusted to the medical 
director of the MCMH.
Moreover, the local position of the company Biolands was 
an additional factor that improved relations between public 
and private stakeholders. The company’s employees had to 
be covered by national schemes, which positioned the com-
pany, a contributor to these schemes, in a positive relation-
ship with the local authorities. Biolands was a major asset in 
negotiating the development of an association since it wanted 
the funds to be managed by a private and not public organisa-
tion. The subsidy from Biolands ended up pressuring the au-
thorities to subsidise the premiums of non-producers.
In practice, the NGO was the driving force behind the part-
nership, but its actions were greatly facilitated by funders 
from the sector (GTZ, USAID, Swiss Cooperation, French 
Cooperation). Without the support that they gave to the 
Ministry of Health, the Regional Directorate and the 
NHIF, local managers probably would not have agreed to the 
derogations that allowed the SMHISs to be positioned in the 
national policy. It is true that this position was acquired ex-
perimentally, but it was not certain that the matching 
fund would beneit organisations other than the CHFs and 
channel resources to a private hospital. Funders also played 
an intermediary role in bringing the Elton John Foundation 
into the project. 
4.2 What are the next steps?
The role played by the NGO, which was intended to transfer 
the scheme that it supported to Tanzanian leaders, and the 
experimental nature of the partnership raise questions regard-
ing its sustainability and its possible extension.
Strictly from the viewpoint of its sustainability, the partner-
ship irst and foremost depends on external contributions of 
inancial resources from the matching fund and Biolands. If 
the network of mutual organisations no longer receives con-
tributions from the public authorities or the company, its i-
nancial viability will become questionable and private estab-
lishments will be weakened. However, the sustainability of 
external resources should be considered differently for these 
two types of contributions. 
Since the matching fund’s subsidies are essential over the 
short-term to public health services and the CHFs, there is no 
reason why it should suddenly disappear. Its end should be 
programmed according to the leverage effect it produces, i.e. 
after period of time that is suficient to allow mutual organ-
isations to be adequately developed. The main risk is the pre-
mature exclusion of SMHISs or CHIFs from the fund’s ben-
eits, which would depend upon a political decision related to 
the universal health coverage scheme. This would be con-
ceivable only if the experiment is negatively assessed and if 
there are alternatives to the current coverage for the informal 
sector. As it is, the CHIF model appears promising and it will 
take some time for the national health coverage scheme to 
signiicantly evolve. Total reconsideration of the model (co-
management and separation of buyers and payers through the 
development of an independent association) is the main po-
litical risk. The argument of the experiment’s critics is that it 
will lead to the privatisation of the CHF.
Is the contribution from Biolands sustainable? It should 
irst be noted that the company’s commitment is limited (ive 
years) but signiicant in terms of time and its contribution 
goes beyond its own suppliers. All of the district’s farmers, 
whether or not they sell their cocoa beans to Biolands, beneit 
from subsidies for contributions, as long as they agree to en-
rol in a CHIF. It is likely that Biolands expects this strategy to 
increase the number of its suppliers. In principle, the partner-
ship will have a windfall effect for Biolands, but it may prove 
counterproductive. Firstly, the results in commercial terms 
may be less promising than expected. The company could 
then decide to subsidise only its own suppliers, or even leave 
the partnership. It could even be forced to do so by the public 
authorities due to unfair competition, since other cocoa-sell-
ing companies may fear or observe a loss of suppliers. While 
the monopolistic position of Biolands was almost too obvi-
ous thanks to the subsidisation of mutual organisations, it 
could be called into question. The best antidote here would 
undoubtedly be to bring other companies into the partnership, 
but this would require mediation by public authorities that 
will not occur until the government truly attempts to bring 
into line the process that will lead to universal coverage. 
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The development of the national scheme for universal 
coverage may either draw from this experiment or move in 
another direction. In terms of the general development of so-
cial protection in the country, it should be noted that the 
SMHISs and CHIFs are examples that combine micro-health 
insurance and free care, since children under the age of 5 do 
not pay the premium. In this respect, they are consistent with 
the general trend that can currently be observed in interna-
tional discussions. 
The NHIF is oficially in charge of extending health cover-
age to the entire population. It is to develop a selection of 
products and distribute it through organisations that are ca-
pable of intervening in households in the informal sector. It is 
clear that the CHFs would need to be transformed to play this 
role, and the CHIF model from this standpoint is a valuable 
solution that should be replicated elsewhere. The fact remains 
that new organisations, set up at district level, having real 
capacities and managed by the NHIF, could, according to the 
Rwandan model, take the place that is currently held in Mbozi 
and Kyela by the networks of participatory management or-
ganisations that the project promoted. It would certainly be 
logical if, along this line, the CHIFs became district agencies 
for the NHIF, especially since the SMHISs and CHIFs have 
capacities, particularly in terms of mobilisation, that the 
NHIF does not have.
One can hope that the results achieved through the cur-
rent partnership will be used to determine the best path for 
the country.
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